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RESUMEN
Esta investigación analiza la separación entre propiedad y control para un promedio de 140 empresas no
financieras en Colombia inscritas en Bolsa de Valores para el período 1996-2002. Dividiendo la muestra de
acuerdo con su estatus de inscripción y por actividad económica, los derechos de votación son mayores a los
derechos de flujo de caja debido a la presencia de propiedad indirecta a través de las firmas que pertenecen a
grupos económicos con estructuras piramidales o de propiedad cruzada. La muestra de estudio incluye un conjunto
importante de empresas no afiliadas. Las estadísticas de propiedad muestran una alta concentración para los
cuatro primeros bloques de votación similar a los niveles observados en Europa continental, aunque el primer
bloque es un 20% menor a lo observado en esta región. Finalmente, las sociedades de inversión y contratos de
fidecomiso tienen un papel central como accionistas controlantes en las empresas y en los conglomerados.
Palabras clave: Propiedad, Control, Corporaciones colombianas
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1. INTRODUCTION
The modern literature of corporate structure has stressed the agency problem where owner-
ship is dispersed and shareholders have a passive role. Executive directors have a strong indepen-
dence and cross incentives through bonus shares payments. This implies that they have incentives
to disclose information when a company’s investments succeeded but they also hide information
when there are significant losses. This figure usually applies to big American corporations and
British publicly traded firms where legislation forbids individual stakes greater than 25%.
Studies published during the last five years had questioning the typical Bearle and Means
(1932) corporation, providing evidence that ownership structures outside the Anglo-Saxon world
are complex due to the existence of cross-shareholdings, webs, pyramids, rings, and other many
types of structures and holdings’ webs. The most representative studies on the issue of measuring
corporate ownership and control beyond the US case since the mid 1990s are perhaps Laporta et
al (1999), Claessenss et al (2000), and Barca and Bech (2001). The first study covers the 20
largest publicly traded firms in each of the 21 OECD economies, along with six non-OECD
countries.2 Their main finding was that the largest shareholders and ultimate owners leverage their
corporate control through pyramids and other hierarchical business group structures.
The second study assembled data on 2,980 East Asian corporations. This study is by far the
most comprehensive regarding the measurement of cash flow to voting rights ratios. The main
finding is that voting rights exceed cash flow rights due to pyramid structures and cross hold-
ings. The third is composed by nine case studies of corporate ownership within continental
Europe. It includes cases in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain.
The common finding across those studies is that ownership and control are highly concentrated
and differs in large scale from the UK and US patterns. In fact, as more results became available
from new country studies, they tend to confirm that widely held corporate structures are outlier
structures and are found mainly in the UK and the US. Such pattern should not differ within
Latin American publicly traded corporations. The largest listed corporations are central pieces
of complex business group structures that form several webs, through property chains between
corporations and unlisted firms, financial and non-financial firms, core and non-core businesses,
and in general different types of pure cross shareholdings.
Business groups in Colombia also respond to complex structures. They are centered around
a core business with strategic alliances in non-core activities along with holding’s investment
and fiduciary funds that play a central role as ultimate controllers as well as key players in
forming coalitions to control boards. This paper provides for the first time evidence in measur-
ing ownership and control for Colombian corporations following the methodologies used in the
studies of La Porta (1999) and their successors, becoming the first comprehensive case study
for one of the main emerging markets in Latin America where there is not much published work
on the topic. Besides this introduction the paper has seven additional sections. Section 2 re-
views the studies on corporate control and governance in Latin America and Colombia. Section
3 explains the used dataset as well as the followed methodology to measure integrated owner-
2 They are: Argentina, Israel, Hong Kong, South Korea, Mexico, and Singapore.6 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
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ship as proxy of investor’s voting rights. Section 4 shows the ownership statistics for an average
sample of 141 real sector listed firms during the 1996-2002 period that were overseen by the
Superintendence of Securities. Section 5 presents the ownership structure analysis of the three
largest and oldest business groups in the country. Section 6 displays the core results regarding
the separation of corporate ownership and control. Section 7 complements the previous exer-
cise by studying the composition of the ultimate controllers and its variation across periods.
Section 8 concludes.
2. CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE STUDIES IN LATIN
AMERICA AND COLOMBIA
The subject of Corporate Governance (CG) has generated many case country studies for
developed economies. In contrast, research for developing economies is limited and new. By
mid-2003 there were few published papers on the topic for the case of Latin America. We
can highlight the work of Agosin and Pastén (2003) who present a description of CG in Chile
during the 90s. They analyze CG as an insider system where business groups control publicly
traded companies. Taking a sample of 177 listed companies, they found i) a high degree of
corporate concentration, a problem that is evident in all economic sectors, and ii) the debt/
equity ratios are low when compared to those of Korea, The last result is puzzling since
insider systems make use of debt instead of equity to finance their projects to protect their
ownership and control structures. The explanation is due to the apparent underdevelopment
of the Chilean capital market and the interlinked debt process of Chilean firms. They also
analyze how the creation of institutional investors, like pension funds have impacted the
domestic capital markets. The authors conclude that poor governance by corporate compa-
nies has rendered the market without liquidity and has impaired a full development of Chilean
capital markets. Escobar et al. (2000) present a complete overview of the new legal mandate
on CG in Chile, Law 19.705 enacted in 2000.
Apreda (2000) reviews CG in Argentina before 1990 and provides an account of the legal
frame adopted in the 90s to implement good governance principles in corporate companies. As
in the Chilean case, it is clear that the development of CG was induced by the privatization of
SOEs and firm mergers. These events framed the evolution of CG in Argentina moving from
family-owned companies to corporate companies driven by foreign and institutional investors,
which have contributed to streamlining the governance system as in common law countries.
Claessens, Klingebiel, & Lubrano (2000) study the Brazilian case. These authors found also
poor governance in Brazilian corporations despite the existence of a Code of Best Practice issued
by the Brazilian Institute of CG. One reason is the prevalence of non-voting shares in corpora-
tions, and the lack of good measures to protect minority investor rights. All in all stock concen-
tration remains very high in Brazil.
Neto (2000) provides an analysis of the legal aspects of CG in Brazil regarding specific
topics. The paper follows a questions-answers format about developments on domestic CG
issues. Saito (2000) reviews the CG legislation in Brazil focusing on the legal determinants of
share composition with voting and non-voting powers, and the degree of protection providedLUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ, CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 7
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to outside investors. The paper tests three hypotheses. The first one tries to see how the ratio of
non-voting equity to total equity correlates with the voting premium, the second test how the
price differential between voting and non-voting stocks behaves with leverage, and the third one
tries to see the impact of the 1997 corporate law on ordinary and preferred marginal shareholders.
Last, Chong et al. (2003) have also studied how (to have good) CG affects the volatility of
private capital flows and to what extent CG can limit the volatility of FDI flows to Latin Ameri-
can countries. Taking some measures (simple and interacted) of CG like the ones proposed by La
Porta et al. (1999), i.e., investor protection (shareholder and creditor rights), they found that “Ef-
fective credit rights and effective shareholder rights play a significant role in limiting how portfolio flows respond to
external nominal shocks”(page 19). Therefore, countrywide developments in CG become a key ele-
ment to avoid disruptive and negative volatility in FDI flows to the country.
Regarding Colombia there are no studies either on corporate governance or corporate owner-
ship and control that follow the modern approach of ultimate controller analysis in representative
studies such as Laporta et al (1999), Claessenss et al (2000), and Barca and Bech (2001) above
mentioned. Nonetheless, there are related studies in the field of capital market development.
Such studies trace back to 1994 when the Finance Ministry [Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito
Público (MHC)] sponsored a series of studies on capital markets known as the Misión de Estudios
sobre el Mercado de Capitales. The collective work had the purpose of advising and making policy
recommendations to MHC in subjects regarding the Colombian capital markets, such us ob-
stacles to their development, the reforms that should be made to the institutional frame, and
the steps needed to develop tools of coverage. The final report3 summarizes the main findings
on seven topics: the capital markets in Colombia, the relationship between the capital mar-
kets and the macroeconomic environment, recent trends and some perspectives in the supply
and demand of financial assets, new products as securisation and leasing, hedging instruments and
over-the-counter markets, and capital market regulatory policies.
The subject of CG is relatively new. It is, then, not surprising that despite the Cadbury report
(p. 11), ‘The financial aspect of CG”, had come to the light in December, 1992, and had for the
first time stated “The country’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency of  its companies. Thus the effective-
ness with which their boards discharge their responsibilities determines British competitive position. They must
be free to drive their companies forward but exercise that freedom within a framework of effective accountability.
This is the essence of  any good corporate governance”, the Mission’s final report did not address the CG
issue as constraint for development of the capital market in Colombia. The Mission’s report did
not mention even once the words of gobierno corporativo, gobernabilidad corporativa, or gobierno
societario, three terms synonymous with CG. The few elements that the report stressed on the
subject were some problems that foreign investors listed in a survey conducted in 1995. The
more relevant ones were that in Colombia there was: i) lack of liquidity, ii) high stock ownership
concentration, iii) insufficient information and iv) lack of transparency in Colombia’s capital
market. Quoting the report, “All in all, the Colombian market was rated among the three least attractive
in Latin America, and among the five least attractive among the emerging markets”. Thus, the mission
report was addressing the CG issue without propose it.
3 Ministerio de Hacienda, Banco Mundial, y Fedesarrollo, “Misión de Estudios del Mercado de Capitales” Informe
Final, mayo 1996.8 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
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The same happened with a recent study about the evolution and behavior of capital markets
in Colombia during the nineties [Arbeláez, Zuluaga, & Guerra (2002)], where the subject and
importance of CG were limited to a single footnote, ignoring the agency theory and empirical
evidence that the literature on financial economics has been stressing during the last 20 years.
However, the study did mention some concerns about regulatory and institutional develop-
ment, but the authors do not seem to give too much weight to them. In fact, they focus their
short and implicit analysis of governance on bank versus market-based modes given their diag-
nostic about the development of capital markets in Colombia. But as La Porta et al (2000a, 18)
state “the classification of financial systems into bank and market centered is neither straightforward nor
particularly fruitful...(and that) ...on average, countries with bigger stock markets also have higher ratios of
private debt to gross domestic product (GDP)” and (2000, 19) that “Investor rights work better to explain
differences among countries, and in fact are often necessary for financial intermediaries to develop.”
On the other hand, we can highlight two descriptive studies about business groups in Co-
lombia that give a rough idea of the nature of the domestic corporate structure. The first one is
the study by Franco and De-Lombaerde (2000) on Colombian parent firms with subsidiaries in
foreign countries. This study presents statistics about Colombian direct investment abroad by
company and industry group during the 1990s. The core analysis centers on the motives that
domestic enterprises had to undertake new foreign investments mainly in other Latin American
markets during the 1990s after the capital flows and foreign investment statute reforms that
were central pieces of the economic openness program of 1991. They present a list of strategic
alliances of Colombian enterprises with foreign investors looking to penetrate markets abroad
and expand their sales. One mechanism has been the establishment of new partnerships with
local or multinational firms already settled in Latin America. This has been the case of Colom-
bian investment in Peru and Venezuela. Their analysis required the assembling of a complete
record of firms by business activity and group affiliation.
The second one is the book of Colmenares (2004) about the history of business groups in
Colombia. This is an updated version of a previous work published in the 1970s by the same
author. This work is a narrative journalist type work with plenty of details but no technical
economic analysis. Nonetheless, it provides useful information regarding the ownership struc-
ture of the largest business groups in the country.4
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data of corporate shareholders used in this study comes from two sources: i) Superin-
tendence of Securities [Superintendencia de Valores (SVAL)] and ii) Superintendence for Commer-
cial Societies [Superintendencia de Sociedades (SSOC)]. These two institutions are responsible for
inspecting and overseeing publicly traded corporations and larger unlisted firms respectively.
The SVAL ownership database comes from the National Equity Registry Forms, which records
information of a company’s top 20 shareholders. This form is mandatory for all equity issuers
4 The official source of parent and subsidiary companies information is at Superintence for Commercial Societies
(Superintendencia de Sociedades) along with chambers of commerce. The Superintendence’s ownership dataset consti-
tutes one of the main data sources of shareholders records used in this study as is explained in section 3.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ, CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 9
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that are under the oversight of the Superintendence, and must be updated on a yearly basis. The
form also records information of names of members o board of directors, number of outstand-
ing shares, number of preferred dividend shares and the nominal value for each type of shares.
The main point of this obligation is that each listed company must provide detailed informa-
tion on its current statutes, the management enrolment list, the relationship of any of its em-
ployees with traders or listed companies at the stock exchange, the composition of the company’s
social capital, and company’s internal rules and regulations.
We assembled shareholders records for 233 real sector companies that were listed during the
1996-2002 period.5 Having a panel dataset of ownership improves the analysis because we can
capture ownership dynamics, an element that is not included in what one usually finds in inter-
national studies of corporate control. Companies were classified according to listing status and
economic activity. The first one shows if by the end of 2002 a particular company was still
listed or rather was de-listed and canceled its equity registry. This feature is important from the
bias selection standpoint. We are including all the successful and failing cases. The second
classifies companies according to ISIC (Rev. 2) one digit codes.6 The above dataset provides
the first and in some cases second layers of a company’s direct ownership stakes.
Table 1 presents the total number of companies with equity issues registered at the Superin-
tendence and by listing status and economic activity for the 1996-2002 period. There are three
details on the data structure worth mentioning. First, the weight of listed companies increases
during the time span passing from 39% in 1996 to 76% in 2002. One natural question that arises
is what explains the persistence of de-listed firms in the sample. The answer is not straightfor-
ward and might be a result of several factors. On one hand, the size of the Colombian stock
market is still small relative to other emerging markets in Latin America. In fact, the traded
volume of stocks relative to fixed income securities has been less than 10% since 1970 up to
2002. On the other hand, most of the companies overseen by the Superintendence are usually
bond issuers rather than stock issuers.
Second, the ownership dataset depends heavily on manufacturing firms, which are more than
50% in the sample. This feature is not a coincidence, it is basically the result of the Colombian
stock exchange structure. Manufacturing firms are the oldest publicly traded firms in the country
and along commercial banks have the highest traded stocks at the exchange. Moreover, we have
manufacturing firms in the sample with more than 50 years of activity in the stock market.7
Third, most of the companies classified as financial, insurance and real estate firms are holding
investment funds (sociedades de inversión) or collective trust funds contracts (fidecomisos de inversión),
which play a central role as ultimate controllers within business groups. Fourth and last, the total
5 We excluded all companies subject to special regulations such as public utilities, financial intermediaries, educa-
tional institutions, and livestock funds were their performance might be affected or induced by regulation and State
property participation, which makes results no comparable.
6 The access to the Superintendence of Securities’ registry forms is publicly available on individual cases. Nonethe-
less, the access to the entire companies’ dossiers needs a special justified request.
7 For example, these are the cases of Bavaria S.A and Fabricato S.A. The first is the leading brewery in the country and
one of the largest in Latin America. The second is the largest textile mill in the county and one of the symbols
within Colombia’s manufacturing history.10 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
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real sector companies registered at the Superintendence during the 1996-2002 period is 257 firms,
thus the study-sample represents 90% of total population.
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF FIRMS IN THE STUDY SAMPLE BY LISTING STATUS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Source: Superintendence of Securities - National Registry Forms
In order to complete a company’s second and in some cases a third property layer, we as-
sembled a dataset of major shareholders’ information of unlisted firms that showed up as a
major shareholder of a listed corporation and affiliated within a business group. This informa-
tion comes from the Superintendence for Commercial Societies. The Superintendence, accord-
ing to Law 222 of 1995, and the subsequent Decree 3100 of 1997, mandates that commercial
companies with total assets or total earnings equal or over twenty thousand legal monthly
minimum wages (US$ 2.9 million) at the end of a given fiscal year are subject to the inspection
and surveillance of the Superintendence. Further, it oversees all commercial companies whose
owners are, in turn, companies subject to oversight and who own at least 20% of the commer-
cial company. In this way, the Superintendence can follow-up all matrix, branch and subsidiary
company. Decree 3100 also empowered it to oversee the subsidiaries of all foreign companies.
Figure 1 explains the assembling process of the entire ownership dataset. At the top of
the figure one finds the listed firms included in the analysis of ownership and control, which
are the companies with records at the Superintendence of Securities for a given year. This group
of firms is what we call the SVAL dataset. The larger shareholders can be an individual or family,
a listed firm, an unlisted firm, a non-profit organization, a holding investment or trust fund, and
other legal contractual forms allowed by law.8 If the shareholder is a firm it can be listed or
unlisted. In the first case, a second layer is added from the SVAL dataset, while in the second we
complete the information with the Superintendence for Commercial Societies or SSOC dataset.
8 For instance, there are the inheritances and dead duties.
  Year 
Status/Economic Activity  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
         
LISTED  71 83  81 79 83 91  102 
DE-LISTED  109 43  62 62 50 42 32 
         
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing  8  5  5  5  5  5  6 
Mining and Quarrying  5  2  3  2  2  2  2 
Manufacturing  88 63  71 72 69 75 73 
Construction  11 4  5 5 4 4 4 
Wholesale, Retail Trade, Lodging Services  25  15  16  15  13  10  11 
Transport, Storage and Communication  13  11  12  12  11  11  12 
Financing, Insurance, Real State  19  18  21  21  19  19  18 
Community, Social and Personal Sevices  8  7  7  6  9  6  8 
Other non-classified Business Activities  3  1  3  3  1  1   
         
Total  sample  180 126  143 141 133 133 134 
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We continue such process until we complete a third layer for most listed companies. Our SSOC
dataset includes information for about 431 unlisted firms from 1996 up to 2002.
The Superintendence requires companies to report annually their balance sheets and income
statements under a common format known as PUC.9 The Superintendence registries include
240 variables for the balance sheet and 12 variables for the income statement. The last one is in
practice a summary of the main accounts of earnings and spending flows. In addition to the
statements there is a file that reports the company’s Tax ID number, legal status, and type of
legal statutes constitution such as corporate, limited liability, cooperative, and SCA firms.10
The financial statements are complemented by 22 annexes, which record information on the
income statement notes, employment, wages and salaries, and investment in fixed assets. The
shareholders information is in appendix 12, which records on average the name of the 10
largest shareholders and their number of outstanding shares for corporations and the partner-
ship shares for limited liability companies. The information recorded at the annexes is confiden-
tial and not publicly available.11 In sum, we assembled three layers of ownership. The first one
or first layer, results directly from the main twenty shareholders provided by the National Secu-
rities Registries of each listed companies. The second layer is formed by those companies,
listed or not, that are (or were) shareholders of the companies included in the SVAL dataset.
The third layer is formed by a listed or unlisted company, that are (or were) the largest owners
of the firms included in the second layer.
3.1. METHODOLOGY
This section discusses conceptual and methodological issues on the measurement of cash
flow rights and voting rights, which constitute the central pieces for the analysis of firm sepa-
ration between ownership and control. The study of ultimate ownership or shareholder con-
troller starts with the fundamental question of asking who really the owner of a firm is: the
investor who has greater direct stakes or the investor who controls. There are several theories in
the fields of Corporate Finance and Industrial Organization that explain the different corporate
and industry structures. The classic view comes from the vertical restrains theory of Spengler
(1950), Mathewson and Winter (1983), and Rey and Tirole (1986), which analyze the incen-
tives for vertical control from an upstream firm to a downstream firm when intermediate good
markets are not competitive. A second theoretical line is based on the delegation problem
within the principal-agent framework from shareholders to company’s directives or CEOs. This
approach is commonly used in corporate governance studies. Since Grossman and Hart (1986)’s
paper this literature has understood owners as those who control a firm.
9 Plan único de cuentas.
10 SCA means “Sociedad en Comandita por Acciones”. Corporate law in Colombia follows the French system, thus SCAs
are the Societes en Commandite par Actions of the French and Belgian system. These are firms with two types of
partnerships: the passive ones or le commnaditaires and the active ones or le commadites. The former delegate control
over the later ones and are accountable for the firm’s liabilities.
11 The University signed in 2003 a cooperation agreement with Superintendencia de Sociedades in order to access the part
of the appendix 12 information. The confidentiality clause implies no disclosure of any individual name in any form.12 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
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The studies of ownership and control have followed two complementary approaches to
identify and measure ultimate controllers. The first one follows the La Porta et al (1999), metho-
dology that defines a firm’s ultimate controller as those shareholders whose direct and indirect
voting rights exceed 20 percent. Under one-share-one vote rule this methodology says that if a
shareholder has a direct stake in a company you have to add something through the indirect
ownership you might have along the property chain. Thus, the ratio of cash flow to voting
rights is less or equal to 1, meaning that 1 dollar of direct investment will provide 1 times (1+x)
voting rights if you have any indirect ownership.
FIGURE 1
OWNERSHIP DATA STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY
Notes: Solid line of rhe scheme shows full disclosure/no statistical constraint by Superintendence of Securities.
Dotted line of the scheme shows no disclosure status.
The second one follows a portfolio view of a company’s direct investments. This methodology
uses an input-output methodology to compute integrated ownership stakes as the sum of direct and
indirect ownership. This approach has been used in several case studies in Japan and continental
Europe, where business groups structures are more complex than those in the US and United
Kingdom due to the existence of cross share holdings, rings, pyramidal cascades, interlocks with
financial institutions and high concentration levels of voting and direct ownership stakes.
Applications are traced back to the work of Brioschi, Buzzachi, and Colombo (1989) and
Ellerman (1991) who used an input-output theory to arrange the ownership structure of firms
and derive a measure of integrated ownership. Flath (1992) took one step further offering a way
to find indirect shareholding. Then Baldone, Brioschi, and Paleari (1997), proposed new refine-
ments in the measurement of integrated ownership for cross share holding groups. The studies
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applied Baldone’s matrix formula to analyze corporate structure and voting blocks in European
conglomerates in seven countries. More recently, Chapelle and Szafarz (2002) and Chapelle
(2004) refine this methodology by including the 51% majority rule to exert firm control under
the assumption of one share-one-vote legislation.
This methodology defines cash flow rights as direct ownership and voting rights as integrated ownership.
Cash flow implies, under the portfolio view that an investor gets the return of his investments
through the direct stakes he owns. If a shareholder i has a 25% stake in firm B and firm A, but
company B owns 25% of firm A, then the shareholder i is entitled to 25% of both firm A and
B’s earnings. If firm B increases its current profits by its investments in firm A, shareholder i
would get greater returns through firm B’s dividend payments and not through firm A. In con-
trast, voting rights includes the indirect ownership dimension. In this case shareholder i exerts
control over firm A. Under the one-share-one-vote rule he has 25% from his direct investment
plus 1/16 of additional votes through firm B.
The starting point in the methodology is the definition of a (NXN) matrix  ij a   A=  of direct
shareholdings, where  ij a  is the observed share of stocks of firm i in firm j. Three properties of
the elements of A in order to be used under input-output hypothesis are:
01 ij a ≤≤ (1)













This model determines the integrated (direct + indirect) ownership on the basis that all firms
are affiliated within a business group. We followed the definition of integrated ownership as the
total value of equities recruited by a firm, which is unknown, but stems from its direct and
indirect ownership on other firms of the business group.12 The first step in implementing this
definition is the solution for the integrated ownership matrix Y = [yij]:
ii j i j i ya a y =+ ∑ (4)
where the first term in the right side of equation (4) represents the direct equity held by firm
i in firm j -ai j, and the second one represents the indirect equity that firm i holds into firm j. The
solution for Y and its presentation in matrix notation is:
12 For more details regarding this formulation, see Ellerman, D (1991); Brioschi, Buzzachi, and Colombo (1989) and
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Y = A + AY  or  Y = A (I-A)-1 (5)
Equation (5) is useful to compute integrated ownership for hierarchical business groups. For
the case of cross-share holdings Baldone et al. (1997) defined integrated ownership as “(…) the
sum of  percentage shares of  total equity shareholder i holds in firm j directly, through cross-shareholdings and
indirectly.” This definition in matrix algebra is equivalent to
{ { ()
Direct Ownership Indirect Ownership
Reciprocal or cross-shareholding ownership
Y= A + Y A - D Y A
1 424 3 (6)
where: D(Y) stands for the diagonal elements of Y and I is an () NN × identity matrix. The
solution for Y in equation (6) is:13
Y = (D(I-A)-1)-1A(I-A)-1 (7)
Thus, we used the formula in (7) to estimate integrated ownership for all affiliated firms in
our sample and followed such an approach because Colombian corporate data resembles the
European group structures with high concentration in direct ownership and voting levels. Lastly,
we computed the firm’s direct ownership through concentration ratios (CR) for the largest
shareholder (CR1), the second largest shareholders (CR2), and so on as desired. The concentra-




















In order to gain understanding of how the matrix approach works in contrast to the manually
adding procedure in counting total voting rights (integrated ownership) of Laporta et al. (1999),
consider the inverse pyramid business group depicted in Figure 2. If one asks, who is the
ultimate controller of F5 in the sense of 20 percent we have two possible candidates: F1 and
F4. The first has 41% votes in F5 and is equivalent to its direct stakes in such a firm. The
second has 40% of the votes in F5 given by its direct stakes plus 4% through firm F4, plus
1.25% from its investments in F2, who in turns owns 45% of F4, adding a total of 45.12% of
voting rights. Hence, F3 is the ultimate controller.
Now consider Table 2 that summarizes the results of Eq. (7). Matrix A is the direct equity
shares of each company within the pyramid equivalent to the percentage shares given in Figure
2. Matrix Y is the integrated ownership matrix of the group. The reading of the results is straight-
forward. Ultimate shareholder controller of F5 is F3 with 45.12%. In addition, the table says
that F3 is the ultimate controller of F4 with 51% of votes and F2 has 4.5% of voting rights in
F5 despite the fact that it does not have any direct stakes in that firm. The above exercise tells
that ultimate controllers are “in practice physical or legal persons that have no known shareholders”
[Becht, (1997)] or the last ownership layer in which information is available, which is the case
13 Appendix 1 shows details on the solution.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ, CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 15
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of F3 or F1 in the example. The implication is consistent and matches with La Porta et al.
(1999)’s ultimate owner definition based on the 20 percent threshold. Clearly, from the compu-
tational point of view the matrix set up is more efficient and useful specially when there are
complex property relations such as cross share holdings.14
FIGURE 2
INTEGRATED OWNERSHIP - PYRAMID STRUCTURE GROUP EXAMPLE
TABLE 2
PYRAMID BUSINESS GROUP EXAMPLE
INTEGRATED OWNERSHIP ESTIMATION
Notes: Matrix A = direct ownership stakes, Matrix Y = integrated ownership
(direct + indirect).
14 There is a common critique for both methodologies in the way of counting the voting rights, since might be
double counting in cross share holdings, and thus integrate ownership statistics might overestimate the concentra-
tion of voting rights when the ultimate owner can not be traced fully such as a holding. An interesting refinement
of this methodology is in system where there are not deviations from one share one vote rule. Applying the simple
majority rule a shareholder with direct shares above 50% will exert company’s total control. For details, see Becht










Matrix A = Direct Ownerhip 
 F1  F2  F3  F4  F5 
F1    0       0   0   0   0,41 
F2    0       0   0   0,45   0 
F3    0  0,25   0   0,40   0,40 
F4    0       0   0   0   0,10 
F5    0       0   0   0   0 
          
Sum    0   0,25   0   0,85   0,91 
          
Matrix Y = Integrated Ownership 
   F1  F2  F3  F4  F5 
F1    0          0   0   0   0,410 
F2    0          0   0   0,450   0,045 
F3    0    0,250   0   0,513   0,451 
F4    0          0   0   0   0,100 
F5    0          0   0   0   0 16 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
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4. OWNERSHIP STATISTICS
A well known fact in Colombia is that corporate ownership and control is highly concen-
trated. This fact has been tied to the formation of conglomerates and business groups from the
1950s to late 1970s where vertical control was the incentive to control productive chains from
upstream to downstream industries. Most of them started as family businesses and then be-
came corporate groups with strategic investments in their core business. In fact, business groups
in Colombia are specialized and differentiated entities in which the holding control is centered-
around key companies. Shareholders’ information in listed companies improved substantially
since 1995 when the Superintendence of Securities issued Resolution 400 regulates corporate
governance issues for all listed companies whose stocks and securities are publicly traded. It
mandates the disclosure of up to the top 20 company’s shareholder as well as the company’s
shares in subsidiary firms as explained in the previous section.15
Corporate control concentration reduces the agency problem between stockholders and com-
panies’ management and might have positive effects on firm valuation, profitability and effi-
ciency. On the other hand, the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders increases. This
paper does not address those issues, which are analyzed and econometrically tested in
Gutierrez, Pombo (2005b). Simply we ask if the distribution of ownership concentration has
recently changed, and by this means we provide new evidence on the structure and patterns
of equity concentration.
Table 3 summarizes the main results of the measurements of direct ownership stakes for
the total sample and listing status. There are four findings worth mentioning. First, our sample
coverage in terms of shareholders identification is high. The information recorded at the RNVIs
of the largest 20 shareholders discloses around 80% of firms’ direct sakes. That disclosure rate
increases among the currently listed corporations from a 0.74 (0.82) for the 1996-1999 period
to 0.78 (0.85) mean (median) during the 2000-2002 period. Second, equity concentration is
high as expected. The largest stake has risen across the two periods. The median increased in 7
percentage points for currently listed corporations, while for the de-listed corporations that
change was 11 percentage points. The overall effect on the total sample mean (median) was an
increase of 5 percent moving from 0.36 (0.30) to 0.41 (0.36) between periods. Equity concen-
tration rises substantially when one analyzes the share of the four-largest direct stakes. In fact,
the concentration rate doubles along the ownership distribution and increases across periods.
15 Resolution 400 has three core elements. First, all listed companies must determine the commercial and legal status
of the company. Second, they have to be listed at the National Security Registry. The main point of this obligation
is that each listed company must provide detailed information on its current statutes, the management enrolment
list, the relationship of any of employees with traders or companies listed at the Registry, the way the social capital
of the company is composed of, and the internal rules and regulations of the company. The same resolution also
mandates that all stocks registered at the RNVI and not traded during two consecutive years will be cancelled by the
Superintendence unless there be at least five hundred shareholders. Third, companies listed in the public stock
exchange must have their records updated, and to provide audited annual information of their financial state-
ments 30 days after being approved by the directory of the company. Additionally, each company listed at the
Registry has to send quarterly information on the income statements and balance sheets 45 days after the end of
each quarter although this does not need to be audited.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ, CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 17
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The mean (median) moved from 0.60 (0.60) to 0.65 (0.69) for the listed firms and from 0.74
(0.79) to 0.77 (0.84) for de-listed corporations.
TABLE 3
OWNERSHIP STATISTICS IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
NUMBER OF FIRMS, SAMPLE COVERAGE, AND DIRECT OWNERSHIP STAKES
BY LISTING STATUS
Source: Own estimations based on new assembled dataset from Superintendence of Securities’ National Equity
Registry Forms (RNVIs).
Notes: direct stakes are equal to direct voting rights under one share one vote rule. Averages per period : 1996-1999 and
2000-2002.
The above numbers suggest that effectively there was a change in the distribution of owner-
ship concentration at firm’s first stake layer. This increases by turn, the direct voting rights of the
largest stockholders. Firm’s absolute control is upheld within a firm’s largest four stakes. Fi-
gures 3 and 4 depict and contrast the change in ownership concentration distribution at CR4
ratio between the years 1996 and 2002, which are the beginning and end dates in the study
sample. The histograms show that the CR4 distribution became left skewed meaning higher
concentration within firms. In 1996 there were two peaks in the frequency distribution at the
0.55-0.65 and 0.9-1.0 bins. For both cases around 22% of the firms in the sample, the four-
largest shareholders had on average control of 60 and 95 percent of the direct voting rights.
This is accurate since computations only include outstanding shares, dropping all preferred
Status/indicator/statistic          
    1996-1999  2000-2002 1996-1999 2000-2002 1996-1999 2000-2002 
Listed corporations     De-listed corporations  Total sample 
Number of firms    79  92   69  41   148   133 
            
Share top-20 shareholders          
Mean    0,7439   0,7851  0,8528  0,8528   0,7941  0,8068 
Median    0,8237   0,8584  0,9272  0,9452   0,8625  0,8949 
75th percentile    0,9414   0,9740  0,9877  0,9965   0,9700  0,9820 
25th percentile    0,6027   0,6652  0,8002  0,8199   0,6761  0,6939 
Standard deviation    0,2355   0,2282  0,1859  0,2230   0,2187  0,2283 
Interquantile range    0,3387   0,3088  0,1875  0,1766   0,2939  0,2881 
            
Share largerst shareholder: CR1      
Mean    0,3003   0,3699   0,4258   0,4906   0,3552   0,4087 
Median    0,2549   0,3215   0,3693   0,4745   0,3041   0,3575 
75th percentile    0,4133   0,4954   0,6012   0,6623   0,4934   0,5470 
25th percentile    0,1432   0,1808   0,2242   0,2974   0,1856   0,2070 
Standard deviation    0,1981   0,2376   0,2373   0,2558   0,2246   0,2511 
Interquantile range    0,2701   0,3146   0,2701   0,3146   0,3078   0,3400 
         
Share top-four shareholders: CR4      
Mean    0,6000   0,6528   0,7377   0,7676   0,6609   0,6890 
Median    0,6056   0,6878   0,7929   0,8440   0,6762   0,7284 
75th percentile    0,7984   0,8726   0,9372   0,9806   0,8721   0,9187 
25th percentile    0,4056   0,4797   0,5769   0,6250   0,5018   0,5106 
Standard deviation    0,2425   0,2543   0,2242   0,2418   0,2428   0,2559 
Interquantile range    0,3928   0,3930   0,3604   0,3556   0,3704   0,4081 
 18 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
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shares which have no voting rights. In addition, corporate law in Colombia according to the
Commercial Code forbids dual shares and any other kind of legal deviations from one-share
one vote rule. In 2002 the four-largest stakes had direct voting rights above 90% in 35% of the
firms in the sample.
Breaking those measurements by economic sector (Table 4), one finds similar patterns for
ownership structure, where the mean (median) of the top-four direct stakes ownership is above
51%, excepting those firms in agriculture and livestock activities where the mean (median) is
around 0.35 (0.35) for the entire period. The most concentrated corporations are located in manu-
facturing where the mean (median) increased from 0.68 (0.69) to 0.73 (0.79), wholesale and retail
trade whose mean (median) remained constant around 0.70 (0.73) and, health and personal ser-
vices whose mean (median) slightly decreased from 0.85 (0.92) to 0.83 (0.84) between periods.16
A natural question concerning the above results is if ownership or direct voting blocks statis-
tics are very concentrated in Colombia. The answer is no if one contrasts the C1 to C4 ratios
with contemporaneous results in continental Europe for non-financial listed companies. For
the largest stockholder, Colombia is below around 20% that the average observed in six out of
the seven European countries in Becht’s study. Numbers start catching up at CR3 or CR4
levels. For the largest top-four stockholders the average sum of the direct stakes is 66% while
Colombia is 65%. Thus, Colombia’s data resembles the European case and so must the struc-
tures of the larger business groups. This numbers are very different for USA and the UK. The
largest block holder in the UK has around 15% while for the sample of listed corporations at
the NYSE the figure is around 8.5%. The next section analyzes the structure of the three
largest, most traditional and important real sector business groups in the country.
16 One point needs further explanation regarding the health care companies in our sample. The health system in
Colombia has two types of private health care provides. One is the so called Heath Promoting Companies, which
belong to the mandatory health program. Their prices are regulated and received cross subsidies from the social
security system. Their main source of income is the social security deductibles from all people with formal labor
contract in the country. The other is the pre-paid medicine companies similar to the HMCO in the US which work
through direct contracts. Those contracts are not price regulated. The main regulation that these companies face is
quality service regulation that is similar to any industry that has to comply with safe product regulation. The
companies in our sample are pre-paid medicine companies and private clinics.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ, CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 19
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FIGURE 3
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Source: Own estimations based on new assembled dataset from Superintendence of Securities’ National Equity Regis-
try Forms (RNVIs).
FIGURE 4
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Source: Own estimations based on new assembled dataset from Superintendence of Securities’ National Equity Regis-
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TABLE 4
OWNERSHIP STATISTICS IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS BY INDUSTRY ISIC GROUP
INDICATOR/INDUSTRY/STATISTIC
Source: Own estimations based on new assembled dataset from Superintendence of Securities’ National Equity Regis-
try Forms (RNVIs).
     1996-1999 2000-2002 1996-1999 2000-2002 1996-1999 2000-2002 
Share top 20 Shareholders  Share largest  Share top four 
           Shareholder: CR1  Shareholders: CR4 
1  Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 
 N  6    5      
 mean  0,3938    0,4102   0,1652   0,1934  0,3448   0,3672 
 median  0,4784    0,4962   0,1302   0,1629  0,3078   0,4073 
              
2  Mining and Quarrying 
 N  3    2      
 mean  0,8373    0,8113   0,3157   0,3642  0,6474   0,6301 
 median  0,8930    0,8113   0,3332   0,3642  0,6708   0,6301 
              
3 Manufacturing 
 N  74    72      
 mean  0,8087    0,8404   0,3740   0,4581   0,6791   0,7358 
 median  0,8831    0,9295   0,3335   0,4317   0,6922   0,7876 
             
5 Construction 
 N  6    4      
 mean  0,7546    0,7163   0,2276   0,2221  0,5797   0,5712 
 median  0,8294    0,8380   0,2191   0,2342  0,5809   0,5838 
              
6  Wholesale, Retail Trade, Restaurants, Lodging Services 
 N  18    11        
 mean  0,8199    0,8045   0,3860   0,3935   0,7054  0,6947 
 median  0,8601    0,8389   0,3267   0,3465   0,7456  0,7273 
              
7  Transport, Storage and Communication 
 N  12    11        
 mean  0,8880    0,8745   0,3078   0,3714  0,7045  0,7208 
 median  0,9502    0,9590   0,2777   0,3485  0,7143  0,7915 
              
8  Financing, Insurance, Real State 
 N  20    19        
 mean  0,7482    0,7282   0,3140   0,2989  0,6015  0,5597 
 median  0,7786    0,7374   0,2577   0,2244  0,5813  0,5067 
              
9  Health and Personal Sevices 
 N  7    8        
 mean  0,9115    0,9147   0,5859   0,5479  0,8489  0,8262 
 median  0,9756    0,9511   0,5455   0,5013  0,9192  0,8417 
              
10 Other  non-classified  business  activities 
 N  3    1        
 mean  0,7006    0,6873  0,2580   0,2191  0,4699  0,4365 
   median  0,6807    0,6873  0,2123   0,2191  0,4440  0,4365 
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TABLE 5
AVERAGE DIRECT OWNERSHIP (DIRECT VOTING RIGHTS) IN
NON-FINANCIAL LISTED FIRMS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
Sources: Becht (1997), Barca and Becht (2001), and Own estimations based on new assembled
dataset from Superintendence of Equities’ National Equity Registry Forms (RNVIs).
Notes: France*: only holding companies; Germany**: Only manufacturing firms;
N: Number of firms;  CR1: share of the largest shareholder; CR2: share top-two
shareholders; CR3: share top-three stockholders; CR4: share top-four stockholders.
5. EXAMPLES OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES
Business group structures in Colombia are complex. There is no restriction for cross-share-
holder structures and regulations regarding mergers, takeovers and minority shareholder pro-
tection are in less develop stages, with low enforcement levels in contrast with the anti-takeover
legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom. On this particular, merged firms must
file for permission at the Superintendence of Industry who establishes if there is a risk for
market dominant position. However, during the last four years some advances in shareholder
protection have taken place. Resolutions 0932, 0072 and 0275 of 2001 of the Superinten-
dence of Securities sought the strengthening of the investor protection ruling, and to lead
domestic legislation toward international standards.17 In addition, it is important to highlight
that since 1923 commercial banks are forbidden to hold any outstanding shares in any real
sector corporation, which is not the case of more advanced capital markets such as Germany
and Japan.
17 The core element of Resolution 0932 is that companies that have securities registered at the RNVI must provide
to the Superintence “information regarding any relevant fact or extraordinary or significant operation or act relative to the
issuer, its business, the registered securities and the supply of those securities to the market”. Among them are decisions
reached by the board of directors, changes in the conditions of the issuer, calls for shareholder’s General Assembly,
changes in the figures contained in the financial statements, distribution of dividends, change of auditor, merger
or acquisition of business lines in the same industry. Resolution 0072 sets the conditions for companies that want
the registration of their stocks to be cancelled from the stock exchanges. It states that a company in delisting from
the stock exchange needs a simple majority of the outstanding shares votes in favor of the cancellation. Resolution
0275 incentive for the voluntary issue of a code of good corporate governance practices in all companies that want
their issued and traded securities to be acquired by Colombian pension funds.
Country  Year N  CR1 CR2 CR3 CR4 
Austria    1996   50  54,1  61,9  64,5  64,7 
Belgium    1995  140  55,9  66,2  70,7  71,5 
France*    1997  228  51,1  72,5  82,6  83,7 
Germany**    1996  372  57,0  59,9  60,5  61,0 
Italy    1996  214  52,3  60,0  63,5  64,4 
Spain    1995  193  32,1  40,1  47,1  50,0 
UK    1992  207  14,4  21,7  27,7  33,0 
USA-NYSE   1996   1309   8,5   12,2  14,0  14,2 
Colombia    1996  180   37,14   50,27   58,65   65,71 
Average Continental Europe    50,42   60,10   64,81   65,86 
Colombia/Avg Continental Europe    0,7366   0,8365   0,9050   0,9977 
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The three larger and best known non-financial business groups in Colombia are the so-called
Sindicato Antioqueño, the Santodomingo group and the Ardila group. These three holdings count for 59
out of 116 affiliated corporations of our sample, and represent more than 50% of sales or fixed
assets for the entire sample of 233 firms (affiliated plus non-affiliated firms). Description follows.
5.1 SINDICATO ANTOQUEÑO
The Sindicato Antioqueño refers to a business group formed by firms in several industries as
well as financial companies. Its core businesses are cement, processed food, roasted coffee,
iron, tobacco, construction, textiles, investment funds, trust funds, investment banks (corporaciones
financieras) and insurance firms. The number of companies affiliated to the group is around 100
between listed and non-listed firms. Its structure is the result of several alliances and web of
firms that make it a pure cross share holding. Its name comes from the province in which its key
companies are based, around the city of Medellin, which has the second largest industrial dis-
trict in Colombia and the largest textile and apparel industries within the Andean countries.
Some of the companies have more that 80 years of being founded. For instance, Industrias
Alimenticias Noel was founded in 1916, Nacional de Chocolates and Fabricato S.A, the largest tex-
tile mill in the country, were both founded in 1920, and Compañía de Cementos Argos began
commercial operations in 1935. Today the heart of the conglomerate is within the cement
industry and is centered around Cementos Argos, which became a holding company in 2000 when
it stopped operations as a cement mill. Argos has direct investments across the largest cement
companies in the country and integrates all the productive chain: stone quarrying, clay, and
sand mining, manufacture of cement, cement mixing, reinforced concrete, and distribution.
Argos’s group has one-half of market share and exports around 2.5 million tons per year.
Figure 5 depicts the two-way direct ownership stakes in 2002 of Argos Company at its first
and second layers. This diagram only offers a partial view of the whole Antioqueño group leaving
aside the textile, food processing, tobacco, metal-ore mining, paper and wood products, construc-
tion, and chemical products chains. Several features from that diagram are worth highlighting.
First, the share of the top-four shareholders stakes adds to 35%, which is almost one half of
the national average. These shareholders with their direct ownership shares are: Fideicomiso Citi
Trust Suramericana (14.5%), Suramericana de Inversiones (5.5%), Inversiones Reacol (5.7%) and Nacional
de Chocolates (3.7%). These numbers suggest that Argos is one of the few cases in Colombia of
a widely held company in the 20 percent sense.
Second, despite the above if one looks the other way around Argos exerts control through its
direct investment in four cement companies (direct stakes): Cementos Paz del Río (21.4%), Cementos
del Valle (28.2%), Cementos del Caribe (65.3%), Cementos del Cairo (95%) and in other four cement
companies through integrated ownership. For instance, Cementos del Caribe owns 72% of Colclinker,
30.2% of Cementos del Valle, 71.2% of Cales y Cementos de Toluviejo, and 52.4% of Carbones Caribe.
At the same time, Cementos del Valle owns 43.3% of Cementos Rio Claro, where Cementos del Cairo
has also a 30% stake. Lastly, Cementos del Cairo owns 53.6% of Cementos Nare where Cementos del
Caribe has a direct stake of 26.8%. Hence, the ultimate controller of all the above companies is
Argos. The above cross share structure generates this type of interlocking behavior. Similar
relations are found inside the group in the other core businesses. Third, there are three invest-LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ, CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 23
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ment funds, one insurance company and one investment-bank that have a key role in financing
the affiliated companies and locking the holding control, since they have direct stakes in almost
all firms. They are Suramericana de Inversiones, Inversiones Reacol, Portafolio de Inversiones Suramericana,
Compañía Suramericana de Seguros, and Corporación Financiera Suramericana [Corfinsura]. They form
a pure web of direct and integrated ownership relations.
FIGURE 5
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Source: Superintendence of Securities’ National Equity Registry Forms (RNVIs).
5.2. SANTO DOMINGO GROUP
The Santo Domingo group is the second largest business group in the country. Its core business
started within the beer industry. Bavaria S.A has been the leading beer company and brand in the
country and is one of the 10 largest firms in Colombia by size of sales and assets. It is also one of
the largest beer companies in Latin America. Bavaria shares have been publicly traded since 1930s24 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
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at the former Bogotá stock exchange. German immigrant Leo Kopp set up the brewery industry in
Bogotá in 1889. During the 1940s, as a result of World War II, the Government expropriated all
equity shares held by German or Italian citizens in Colombian firms. By 1967 the Santodomingo
family took control of the company through their former brewery of Barranquilla.18
Despite its strong and historical presence in Colombian economic activities, the Santo Domingo
Group had only 17 listed firms in the 1996-2002 period. Figure 6 shows the holding structure for
the main companies, including some unlisted ones. This group has a pyramidal structure, although
there are cross shares among some firms. The pyramid has two main branches. One is made of the
beer companies headed by Bavaria who is the ultimate controller with direct stakes in Malterias de
Colombia (76%), and Cerveceria Aguila (50%) and Sofasa (51%) the auto assembly producer. Through
the first one it controls Conalvidrios which is the supplier of glass bottles for the beer industry,
and by means of these former two companies it exerts absolute control over Productora de Jugos and
Inversiones Aconcagua, a holding investment fund. The beer companies do not have foreign inves-
tors among the largest shareholders although some foreign-based holdings appear as small stock-
holders. Valores Bavaria, which is the group’s trust fund, heads the other holding branch. The
largest and most important companies on this side are Avianca, the largest passenger airline,
Caracol Radio and Caracol TV a media communications companies, Colseguros the insurance
branch of the group, Polipropileno del Caribe, a manufacturer of petrochemicals and synthetic
resins, and Grandes Superficies de Colombia (Carrefour) the second largest retail trade chain in the
country, and Celumovil (Bell-South Colombia) the cellular phone company.
All the above companies have important foreign investment stakes. In fact, the Santo Domingo
group has a very small minority stake in the insurance company Colseguros, where 93.6% of the
company is currently owned by a foreign investor. Polipropileno del Caribe in turn is basically
foreign-owned (50% ). Sofasa and Bell-South Colombia are two companies in which Santo Domingo
has some presence. In the first one, it has a majority stake but this is also a strategic alliance
Renault and Toyota must supply the complete body of the cars. In Celumovil (Bell-South Co-
lombia), again foreign investors have the majority and the group by means of two holding funds
Inversiones Bavaria and Union de Valores acts as a strategic partner. Finally, Union de Valores is at
the top of the group with direct stakes in Bavaria (30%) and in Valores Bavaria (30%). There-
fore, under the 20% sense this holding fund is the ultimate controller of the group. All in all, the
Santo Domingo group shares most of the characteristics present in the Sindicato Antioqueño
except the fact that there is no substantial cross-shareholding. In some cases, if foreign capital
(or expertise) is needed, then strategic alliances are implemented.19
18 For more details on the History of Colombia’s leading enterprises and the development of the manufacturing
industry see: Davila (2003), Mayor-Mora A., (1989), Ocampo J. A (1991, 1994), Echavarria (2000), and Pombo (2002).
19 The group undertook a restructuring process since 2002. The most important transaction within the group’s
enterprises was the merger of Avianca with the second domestic largest air carrier (ACES), and its following sale of
75% of company’s shares to the Synergy Group of Brazil in December of 2004.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ, CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 25
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Source: Superintendence of Securities’ National Equity Registry Forms (RNVIs)





























































































































































































































































































# * 26 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
Borradores de investigación - No. 66
5.3. ARDILA- GROUP
The Ardila group is the third main conglomerate and dominates the soft-drink industry. Its
leading company is Postobon S.A founded in 1905 in Medellín by Gabriel Posada and Valerio
Tobón, as Gaseosas Posada & Tobón. Thanks to the rapid market growth the company signed a
distribution franchise with Coca-Cola in 1927 that lasted until 1937 when the multinational de-
cided to build its own plants in Colombia. One small shareholder of Postobon was Gaseosas Lux,
owned by Carlos Ardila. Lux was a regional soft drink firm that gradually leveraged its stakes to
take control over Postobon in 1968. Also in the sixties the company got the franchise for Pepsi Co.
Despite its growing importance and long history in Colombian business activity during the last
four decades, the Ardila group surprisingly has had until year 2000 four listed companies: Compañía
Colombiana de Tejidos (COLTEJER), RCN TV, PELDAR S.A and Ingenio del Cauca S.A; none of
them are soft-drink companies and the last two got de-listed during the late 1990s.20
Figure 7 describes the holding structure for the year 2000. It includes, besides the listed
ones, the holding’s main unlisted companies. The diagram has two main bodies that follow the
beverage industry chain: i) the soft drink companies labeled as “Gaseosas” and ii) the soft
drink’s upstream industries. They are to the left and to the right of the group’s leading enter-
prises: Gaseosas Postobon and Gaseosas Colombianas. The figure shows that the two ultimate con-
trollers for these two set of companies are two holding investment funds: Servicios e Inversiones
S.A (Servinsa) and Inversiones Gamesa S.A. The first one has direct stakes in Postobon (45%),
Gaseosas Colombianas (45%), while the second one owns a 46% stakes in Postobon and 39% in
Gaseosas Colombianas. Hence, these two funds exert absolute control over the group’s two larg-
est soft drink companies. At the same time both funds have direct stakes of 48% in eight
medium-size and regional soft drink companies, and 23% in other one.
The group has vertical control in the production of key inputs. On one side, it has direct
investments in three large sugar refining mills. The holding funds together own 53% of Ingenio
del Cauca, which owns 45% of Ingenio Providencia which in turn owns 9% of Ingenio Risaralda,
where Ingenio del Cauca has a 20% stake. Providencia is the second main shareholder of Sucromiles,
a company that manufactures citric acid. On the other side, the holding funds control the
manufacturer of bottle lids [Tapas la Libertad] with a stake of 89%. The group also has control
over its distribution network. The truck fleet is gathered in Empresa de Distribución Industriales
S.A which is controlled by Servisa and Besmit S.A with 88% stake. This is another holding
company with direct and representative investments across the group beverage firms. To square
the circle, the group has stakes in PELDAR S.A, the glass manufacturer, in which there is a
representative foreign investment share.21
The group has large investments in several non-core businesses. The most representative are
textiles and the media and communication industries. The Ardila group took control over Coltejer
S.A in 1978. This firm started operations in 1909 and was, along with Fabricato S.A the largest
textile mill in the country and previously affiliated as well to the Sindicato Antioqueño group.
20 Gaseosas Postobón S.A got listed in 2004 and registered at the Superintence of Securities.
21 PELDAR was founded in 1939 and since the 1940s got over the control of Owens Illinois Glass Co. Today the
largest shareholders are Owens Brockway Glass Inc, and Fiducomercio which is a Bank trust fund.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ, CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 27
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Today more than 15 affiliated companies are within the top 20 shareholders with an aggregate
stake of 80%. Regarding the media companies these are RCN radio and RCN TV, where the
holding investment funds Gamesa and Servinsa are the ultimate controllers. Both funds have a
53% stake in RCN Radio, which in turn owns 38% of RCN TV and along with the 14% stake
of Gamesa investment they exert absolute control over that firm.
FIGURE 7
THE ARDILA GROUP – 2000
Source: Superintendence of Securities’ National Equity Registry Forms (RNVIs), and Superintendence for Commercial
Societies
Summarizing, the above analysis of the largest business groups in Colombia showed the
existence of a mixture of ownership structures, high rates of direct stakes concentration, and
full specialization in each group core business. There are no intra-group investments. If there is
some, it is as a minority stockholder such as the case of Coltejer where some companies affiliated
to the Sindicato have around 10% stake in the company. In addition, entrepreneurial history in
Colombia has shown no successful undertakings when one conglomerate seeks entry and com-
petes for a rival’s core-markets. Perhaps the most representative and recent example was when
the Ardila group built a new brewery in 1994. Six years later the company was acquired by
Bavaria, because of its cash flow deficits and low plant low capacity utilization rate.
6. THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
The agency theory suggested for Berle and Means (1932)’s American-type Corporation be-














































































































































































































































































































































28 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
Borradores de investigación - No. 66
firm performance and corporate valuation. La Porta et al (1999)’s study of corporate ownership
around the world and following papers highlight as a consistent fact that ownership structures
are complex where ultimate controllers leverage their voting through cross shareholding and
pyramidal relations. When conglomerates become highly concentrated reduces the agency pro-
blem but creates new ones. The Colombian main holdings resemble European holding struc-
tures as was shown by contrasting the ownership statistics of the larger voting blocks within
listed corporations. Ownership matters in both ways that is, being an anonymous shareholder
of a big corporation facing strong management structures or being a strong owner that manages
the firm. The latter poses new questions such as the incentives to expropriate minorities, or the
rules of the game among the largest voting blocks when none of them has an absolute control.
Clearly rent-seeking behavior is part of the theory but there is a need for further modeling of
the agency problem across largest ownership blocks within conglomerates with complex two-
way ownership relations. The measurement of voting rights in this study relies on the concept
of a shareholder’s integrated ownership (direct + indirect), while cash flow is associated with direct
ownership. In terms of control the first one provides the indirect votes and the latter gives direct votes.
Thus, the separation between ownership and control is given by the direct to integrated ownership
ratio and must be less than one by construction.
Table 6 displays the results regarding the measurements of the separation ratio for the larger
shareholder, who is in most cases an ultimate controller under the 20 percent cutoff level. We
considered two time spans, before and after 2000. Several facts are visible from that table. First,
de-listed corporations are more concentrated than listed ones. The mean (median) of the largest
controller shareholder is 0.42 (0.37) for the de-listed ones, while the largest controller in the listed
ones is around 10 basis points lower at 0.30 (0.25). Second, the largest voting block increased
over time for both listed and de-listed firms. The median of the largest voting block for the listed
(de-listed) firms moved from 0.32 (0.45) to 0.38 (0.50) after 2000. Third, concentration of voting
is greater in manufacturing, and health and personal services companies but with opposite trends.
In manufacturing the median of the voting concentration rises by ten points passing from 0.36 to
0.46, while in health companies the median decreases from 0.53 to 0.50. Regarding the financial
and insurance companies, they are composed by holding investment or trust funds and play a
role as ultimate controllers within the business groups. The voting concentration has remained
constant, so these ultimate owners are still strategically the same. Fifth, separation ratios are high
and above 0.9 in most cases. This reflects that firm control is exerted through direct ownership.
Thus, corporate structure follows a strong owner management bias. In other words, owners com-
mand, control boards and appoint CEOs.
The overall ratios tend to be slightly higher in Colombia (0.94, 0.96) than those found in
other studies. For instance Chapelle (2001) reports a 0.80 separation ratio for the large voting
block for 135 listed Belgium firms in 1995. Claessens et al (2000) report an overall ultimate
controller separation ratio average of 0.74 for 2,611 publicly traded East Asian corporations
for 1997. Among them Hong Kong reports a ratio of 0.88, Philipines of 0.90, and Thailand of
0.94. In addition, La Porta et al. (1999) find that for the cases of Argentina and Mexico ultimate
controllers need around 19.6% and 16.5% of cash flow to get 20% voting rights. It is important
to point out that deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule are low, meaning separation ra-LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ, CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 29
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tios close to one, in two opposite cases. The first is associated with widely held corporations with
lower voting power for the largest stockholders such as the case of the top 20 corporations in the
US as presented in La Porta et. al (1999). The second case arises in highly concentrated owner-
ship structures where the largest voting block has companies’ absolute control with overall
direct votes greater than 50%. This case will induce a strong control bias toward owners. Thus,
there is no need of further voting leverage through indirect ownership investments.
TABLE 6
SEPARATION OF CASH FLOW TO VOTING RIGHTS IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
(LARGEST VOTING BLOCK: BY LISTING STATUS AND INDUSTRY GROUP
(AVERAGE PER PERIOD)
  1996 - 1999  2000-2002 
  N  Mean Median P75  P25    N  Mean Median P75  P25 
A. Cash Flow Rights (Direct Ownership)                 
                 
LISTED CORPORATIONS  79  0,300  0,255  0,413 0,143  92  0,370  0,322  0,495 0,181 
DE-LISTED CORPORATIONS  69  0,426  0,369 0,601  0,224 41 0,491  0,475 0,662  0,297 
                 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing  6 0,165  0,130 0,263  0,102  5 0,193  0,163 0,285  0,094 
Mining and Quarrying  3  0,316  0,333  0,436  0,197 2  0,364 0,364  0,542  0,187 
Manufacturing 74  0,374  0,333  0,514 0,184  72  0,458  0,432  0,609 0,256 
Construction 6  0,228  0,219  0,272  0,175 4  0,222 0,234  0,283  0,162 
Wholesale, Retail Trade, Lodging Services  18 0,386  0,327 0,533  0,235 11 0,394  0,346 0,598  0,205 
Transport, Storage and Communication  12  0,308  0,278 0,426  0,192 11 0,371  0,349 0,504  0,209 
Financing, Insurance, Real State  20  0,314  0,258 0,370  0,169 19 0,299  0,224 0,360  0,118 
Community, Social and Personal Sevices  7  0,586 0,546  0,765  0,425 8  0,548 0,501  0,725  0,385 
Other non-classified business activities  3  0,258 0,212  0,396  0,165 1  0,219 0,219  0,219  0,219 
                 
Total sample 148  0,355  0,186  0,304  0,493  133 0,409  0,207 0,357  0,547 
                 
B. Voting Rights(Integrated Ownership)                 
                 
LISTED CORPORATIONS  79  0,319  0,276  0,460 0,164  92  0,388  0,354  0,532 0,201 
DE-LISTED CORPORATIONS  69  0,446  0,389 0,662  0,253 41 0,506  0,475 0,745  0,306 
                 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing  6 0,177  0,136 0,279  0,105  5 0,204  0,180 0,300  0,098 
Mining and Quarrying  3  0,394  0,432  0,571  0,217 2  0,393 0,393  0,600  0,187 
Manufacturing 74  0,400  0,369  0,564 0,205  72  0,476  0,460  0,669  0,281 
Construction 6  0,228  0,219  0,272  0,175 4  0,222 0,234  0,283  0,162 
Wholesale, Retail Trade, Lodging Services  18 0,399  0,333 0,569  0,241 11 0,413  0,363 0,635  0,205 
Transport, Storage and Communication  12  0,329  0,308 0,428  0,223 11 0,397  0,360 0,504  0,267 
Financing, Insurance, Real State  20  0,336  0,284 0,383  0,195 19 0,319  0,269 0,392  0,139 
Community, Social and Personal Sevices  7  0,586 0,546  0,765  0,425 8  0,548 0,501  0,725  0,385 
Other non-classified business activities  3  0,258 0,212  0,396  0,165 1  0,219 0,219  0,219  0,219 
                 
Total Sample 148  0,375  0,200  0,322  0,516  133 0,426  0,224 0,379  0,585 
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Source: Own estimations based on new assembled dataset from Superintendence of Securities’ National Equity
Registry Forms (RNVIs).
Notes: separation ratio = direct ownership /integrated ownership.
Despite the above, the separation ratios for Colombian corporations decrease around 15
percentage points if one computes that measure relative to the top-four largest stockholders
according to the findings reported in Table 7. The mean (median) of the separation ratio for
the total sample decreases to a 0.75 (0.82) level. Here it is clear that there is voting leverage
through investments in pyramidal or cross shareholding structures. In addition, the separation
ratio measures for the largest and ultimate controller within the Sindicato Antioqueño group is
lower than the total sample. The mean (median) was 0.85 (0.87) for the 1996-1999 period, and
slightly arose to 0.89 (0.89) after 2000. Hence, the presence of cross ownership across firms
increases total voting leverages of ultimate owners.
TOWARD A COALITION HYPOTHESIS OF CORPORATE CONTROL?
The separation ratio measures suggest that there is an owner-control bias in contrast to the strong
management and passive investor role observed in US corporations. To illustrate the control
direction bias we used the cumulative distribution functions (c.d.f) for the largest direct voting
block and the top-two direct voting blocks as used in the studies collected by Barca and Becht
(2001). The intuition behind these graphs is to find how asymmetric a cumulative distribution
function is. Concentration ratios by definition are within the zero-one interval. Thus, the maxi-
mum value for an ownership stake is 100% of a company’s net worth.
Cont. Table 6
  1996 - 1999  2000-2002 
  N  Mean Median P75  P25    N  Mean Median P75  P25 
C. Cash Flow to Voting Rights Ratio                 
                 
LISTED CORPORATIONS  79  0,941  0,919  0,898 0,874  92  0,953  0,909  0,933  0,896 
DE-LISTED CORPORATIONS  69  0,955  0,949 0,909  0,889 41 0,970  1,000 0,894  0,971 
                 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing  6 0,929  0,955 0,924  0,976  5 0,945  0,914 0,930  0,965 
Mining and Quarrying  3  0,780  0,762  0,744 0,891  2  0,927  0,927  0,904  1,000 
Manufacturing 74  0,934  0,903  0,913  0,897 72 0,963  0,939 0,908  0,910 
Construction 6  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000 4  1,000 1,000  1,000  1,000 
Wholesale, Retail Trade, Lodging Services  18 0,968  0,981 0,949  0,974 11 0,951  0,955 0,940  1,000 
Transport, Storage and Communication  12  0,932  0,895 0,994  0,868 11 0,931  0,961 1,000  0,780 
Financing, Insurance, Real State  20  0,930  0,899 0,962  0,867 19 0,934  0,835 0,908  0,871 
Community, Social and Personal Sevices  7  1,000 1,000  1,000  1,000 8  1,000 1,000  1,000  1,000 
Other non-classified business activities  3  1,000 1,000  1,000  1,000 1  1,000 1,000  1,000  1,000 
                 
Total Sample  148 0,948  0,930 0,945  0,957  133 0,960  0,926 0,943  0,936 
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TABLE 7
SEPARATION OF CASH FLOW TO VOTING RIGHTS IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
TOTAL SAMPLE TOP-FOUR VOTING BLOCKS AND THE ULTIMATE SHAREHOLDER
OF SINDICATO ANTIOQUEÑO GROUP
Source: Own estimations based on new assembled dataset from Superintendence of Securities’
National Equity Registry Forms (RNVIs).
Notes: separation ratio = direct ownership /integrated ownership.
If the distribution is uniform with equally proportioned stakes across firms, its cumulative
distribution function would be the 45 degree line. That is, there is no dispersion with respect to
the distribution median. If the cumulative function for the largest direct voting block (CR1) lies
below the 45% degree line, this means that there is low ownership concentration along with
low levels of block-holder power. In the opposite case, if the c.d.f of the largest voting block
is above the 45 degree line, it represents the existence high ownership concentration and block-
holder power.
Corporate control bias direction will be towards having a strong-management bias for the
first case and owner-private bias in the second case. Figure 8 depicts the c.d.f for the largest
direct voting block (CR1) for 134 listed firms in Colombia for year 2002. The c.d.f lies on the
45% degree line at a fraction of data smaller than 20% where it crosses the 45% line. Stakes at
this point are evenly distributed for the sample 20 percent. At the 50% fraction of the data
direct ownership stakes are around 40%. These numbers are lower than the figures reported for
1996 - 1999  2000-2002 
N mean  Median  P75  P25  N mean  Median  P75 P25 
                
   Total Sample Top-four largest shareholders: CR4    
                
A. Cash Flow Rights (Direct Ownership)          
  148   0,794   0,676   0,862   0,970   133   0,807   0,694   0,895   0,982 
                
B. Voting Rights (Integrated Ownership)          
                
  148   1,032   0,804   0,965   1,158   133   1,091   0,853   0,991   1,297 
                
C. Cash Flow to Voting Rights Ratio          
                
  148   0,7697   0,8409   0,8939   0,8378   133   0,7398   0,8134   0,9032  0,7573 
   Sindicato Antioqueño Group - ultimate shareholder    
A. Cash Flow Rights (Direct Ownership)          
                
  30   0,2790   0,2398   0,3759   0,1290   29   0,3553   0,3028   0,4917  0,1879 
                
B. Voting Rights (Integrated Ownership)            
                
  30   0,3280   0,2731   0,4760   0,1618   29   0,3995   0,3384   0,5611   0,2216 
                
C. Cash Flow to Voting Rights Ratio            
                
  30   0,8507   0,8780   0,7897   0,7970   29   0,8893   0,8950   0,8763   0,8481 
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the cases of Belgium, France and Italy [Barca and Becht (2001)], and are consistent with the
numbers of table 5 because the largest shareholder on average has 20% less voting power in
Colombia with respect to the European average (excluding the UK).
Renneboog (2001) and Becht (2001) show that such distributions follow an inverse-L shape
for the United Kingdom and United States cases. In particular their findings show that at a 50%
fraction of data, direct ownership stakes are less than 10% in the UK, and less than 5% in the US.
The opposite case is Germany, where the c.d.f of the largest direct voting block lies above the
45% line. At the 50% fraction of data direct ownership is around 60%, meaning an absolute
control of the largest shareholder across German companies under the one share one vote regime.
The picture changes drastically if one plots the c.d.f for the top-two largest voting blocks.
Figure 9 summarizes the results where the c.d.f is above the 45% degree line. Thus, there is
absolute control if the two largest shareholders collude in order to take over companies’ board
and management. In affiliated companies usually the two largest shareholders belong to the
holding. However, this might not the case for the non-affiliated ones or for holdings with sub-
stantial cross shares where the second and third largest voting blocks play an important strate-
gic role in keeping the group control across the holding’s firms. Next section explores what is
the composition of ultimate owners.
7. ULTIMATE SHAREHOLDERS
A central question regarding corporate ownership is who the ultimate shareholders are. If a
firm has an ultimate controller means that she has enough voting rights to exert a firm’s control.
Concentration of voting rights is crucial for the designing of a firm’s management, dividend,
and investment policies. This section reports the differences of concentration of control as
well as changes across time for 173 listed firms in 1996 and 126 corporations for 2002 that
were overseen by the Superintendence of Securities. Tables 8 and 9 summarize the results of
controlling shareholders’ composition and their separation ratio by type of firm’s legal form
under the cutoff of the 20 percent voting rights. There are several important results.
The first finding concerns to ultimate shareholders composition. Family controlled firms
have low weight within the study sample for both years. They represent at most 6.5% (1996)
within the total sample and they reduce to 3.3% (2002) if one restricts the sample to affiliated
firms to business groups. This outcome at first glance is opposite to what have been found in
international studies of corporate control for emerging markets. For instance, La Porta et al.
(1999) reports that family controlled firms represent 65% in Argentinean corporations and
100% for the case of Mexico for large and medium-size publicly traded firms. The results of
Claessenss et al. (2000) go in the same direction. In particular, under the 20% cutoff, family
controlled firms represent on average 58% of their study sample for East Asian Corporations.
Indonesia has the highest rate with 71.5% and Philippines the lowest with 45%. The exception
of this study is Japan, an OECD country, where family controlled firms are around 10%. Thus,
the above numbers would indicate that ultimate controllers in Colombia have similar characteris-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 .25 .5 .75 1
Fraction of the data
Percentile plot of the largest shareholder - 2002



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 .25 .5 .75 1
Fraction of the data
Percentile plot of the top-two shareholders - 2002
Source: Own estimations based on new assembled dataset from Superintendence of Equities’ National Equity Registry
Forms (RNVIs).
However, this is not the case if one takes a closer look of the data and figure out who are
behind of some type of legal societies. The business groups analyzed in section 5 showed that
holding funds or investment firms play a key role as controlling shareholders of affiliated cor-34 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
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porations but also as the entire holding ultimate shareholders. Family owners are hidden
within those investment firms and trust fund contracts. This also applies for an important
number of unlisted corporations and limited liability partnership firms. For instance, con-
sider the holding fund Union de Valores at the top of the Santo Domingo group pyramid. A
main shareholder of Bavaria company, is the Santo Domingo company CSA who by turn is the
largest shareholder of Union the Valores and that fund has the largest stake (30%) in Valores
Bavaria the other investment fund that controls all the group non-core (bear) businesses. Hence,
the Santo Domingo family is the ultimate owner of the 17 listed firms included in our study
sample as well as around 100 unlisted companies and commercial societies.
If one replicates the analysis for other business groups in the country, excepting the Sindicato
Antioqueño, one finds families hidden in investment firms, trust funds, and in several types of
unlisted firms.22 Therefore, if one gathers all investment firms, trust fund contracts, limited
partnership and around 50% of the unlisted corporations as controlling family firms we have
that they represented for the total sample 38% in 1996 and 43% in year 2002. For affiliated
firms these numbers are 51% and 56%. Those numbers doubles what is common observed for
continental Europe (18%) but still significant lower than the Argentinean and Mexican cases as
well as in East Asian countries.
The second finding is that widely held firms represent around 28% of ultimate sharehold-
ers in 1996 despite ownership concentration within corporations. Here, the same caveat for
investment firms applies. In several cases these widely held partnerships were unlisted firms, in-
vestment and trust funds showed up as ultimate controllers. These cases is common to suspect
that if you have 10 family members or relatives with uniform shares none of them will have
more than 10% voting rights and show up statistically as a widely held firm. Around 40% of the
widely held firms matched with investment firms, individual fiduciary contracts and unlisted
firms where families are the final owners. The remainder 60% were truly widely held firms in
the sense that the sum of minority shareholders had the largest stake in those companies. Widely
held firms decreased their participation to 10% by 2002.
The third result is that financial institutions play a limited role as controlling shareholders in
contrast the truly equity power of families as mentioned, and the significant of ownership do-
mestic corporations. Banks are forbidden by regulation to have direct stakes in real sector com-
panies. However, they make presence through subsidiary firms such as trust funds, investment
banks, and insurance companies. For both years financial institutions are less than 10% of the
controlling owners. This finding is consistent with those numbers reported in La Porta (199)
and Classensen (2000) studies. Domestic corporations are the second source for controlling
shareholders, representing around 25% for both years, and foreign firms increased their partici-
pation as ultimate owners from 1996 to 2002. This is consequence of strategic alliances within
groups and by the recent capital inflows experienced across Latin American markets. Last, the
22 Information regarding individual shareholders and names of investment funds is recorded in some cases at the
Superintendence of Societies data base, which as mentioned is confidential for third parties. In addition, is common
to find investment firms that are not registered at any Colombia’s chambers of Commerce and located in Panama
City, Caiman Islands and other fiscal paradises which impede the tracing of further shareholders.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ, CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 35
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role and presence of the State as ultimate owner is limited, which is a consequence of the small
size of Colombian public sector relative to their Latin American peers.23
TABLE 8
ULTIMATE SHAREHOLDERS AND THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN
1996 - 20% CUTOFF
Source: Own estimations based on new assembled dataset from Superintendence of Securities’ National Equity Regis-
try Forms (RNVIs) and shareholders information of Superintendence for Commercial Societies.
23 The miscellaneous category reported in ultimate controlling shareholders’ tables includes private foundations,
cooperatives, universities, live stock funds among other legal forms of commercial societies.
TOTAL SAMPLE 1996 







Rights  Mean Min  Max 
Family 11  6,4  0,322  0,322  1  1  1 
Investment firms  23  13,3  0,280  0,334  0,860  0  1 
Trust funds  3  1,7  0,453  0,453  1,000  0,999  1 
Financial Institutions  12  6,9 0,327  0,351  0,918  0,601  1 
Domestic Corporations  40  23,1 0,424  0,456  0,929  0,402  1 
Limited Liability  8  4,6  0,289  0,366  0,811  0  1 
Widely Held  49  28,3  0,278  0,282  0,959  0  1 
Foreign Firm  12  6,9  0,484  0,484  1  1  1 
State 7  4,0  0,522  0,522  1  1  1 
Missellaneous 8  4,6  0,369  0,369  1  0  1 
              
Total Sample  173 100  0,3503    0,37  0,9388 0  1 
HOLDING FIRMS 1996 
Family 2  2,2  0,467  0,467  1  1  1 
Investment firms  18  20,0  0,288  0,357  0,821  0  1 
Trust funds  2  2,2  0,244  0,244  0,999  0,999  1 
Financial Instititutions  8  8,9 0,191  0,227  0,876  0,601  1 
Domestic Corporations  27  30,0 0,396  0,443  0,895  0,402  1 
Limited Liability  3  3,3  0,120  0,326  0,496  0  1 
Widely Held  21  23,3  0,116  0,125  0,904  0  1 
Foreign Firm  4  4,4  0,261  0,261  1  1  1 
State 1  1,1  0,267  0,267  1  1  1 
Missellaneous 4  4,4  0,293  0,293  1  1  1 
              
Total Affiliatted Firms  90 100  0,2676 0,31  0,8824  0  1 
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TABLE 9
ULTIMATE SHAREHOLDERS AND THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN
2002 - 20% CUTOFF
Source: Own estimations based on new assembled dataset from Superintendence of Securities’ National Equity Registry
Forms (RNVIs) and shareholders information of Superintendence for Commercial Societies.
The fourth result regards with the voting power of controlling shareholders. On average
ultimate owners had 37% voting rights for the total sample and 31% for affiliated firms in
1996. These numbers increased to 42% and 38% in 2002. Ultimate owners have more separa-
tion of cash flow to control voting within holding firms. On average the separation ratio is 94%
for the total sample and 89% for holding firms where there exists more voting leverage through
pyramids and cross share holdings. Investment and domestic corporations show lower separa-
tion ratios for both years within affiliated firms meaning that they have more ownership rela-
tions and links within business groups. One detail is that the average voting power of widely
held firms might exceed the 20% cutoff. This is because for some companies the blocks of
minority shareholders add up in some cases to 80%, and there is no information of how many
individuals form those voting blocks in order to figure out minorities’ average voting rights.
Another finding is that separation ratios have a minimum value of zero in both years for several
cases such as investment, limited liability and domestic corporations. This means that in some
companies there are controlling shareholders with zero cash flow and have the greatest voting
TOTAL SAMPLE 2002 







Rights  mean Min  Max 
Family 7  5,556  0,387  0,387  1  1  1 
Investment firms  34  26,984  0,445  0,471  0,912  0,160  1 
Trust funds  6  4,762  0,353  0,353  0,996  0,970  1 
Financial Instititutions  7 5,556  0,451  0,451 1  0,089  1 
Domestic Corporations  33  26,190  0,438  0,469  0,897  0  1 
Limited Liability  4  3,175  0,523  0,523  1  0,921  1 
Widely Held  13  10,317  0,249  0,295  0,933  0,181  1 
Foreign Firm  15  11,905  0,574  0,574  1  0,948  1 
State 3  2,381  0,493  0,493  0,998  0,587  1 
Missellaneous 4  3,175  0,244  0,307  0,790  1  1 
           
Total Sample  126  100  0,4246  0,4465  0,9354  0  1 
HOLDING FIRMS 2002 
Family 2  2,222  0,418  0,418  1  1  1 
Investment firms  34  37,778  0,445  0,471  0,912  0,160  1 
Trust funds  6  6,667  0,353  0,353  0,996  0,970  1 
Financial Instititutions  3 3,333  0,232  0,232 1  0,089  1 
Domestic Corporations  25  27,778  0,406  0,446  0,864  0  1 
Limited Liability  1  1,111  0,500  0,500  1  1,000  1 
Widely Held  6  6,667  0,139  0,238  0,855  0,181  1 
Foreign Firm  8  8,889  0,390  0,390  1  0,948  1 
State 2  2,222  0,340  0,341  0,998  0,587  1 
Missellaneous 3  3,333  0,135  0,219  0,720  1  1 
           
Total Affiliatted Firms  90  100  0,3829  0,4136  0,9096  0  1 
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rights. This is a strong outcome that reinforces the previous results, and constitutes an evidence
of the real voting power leverage that takes place within business group companies.
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has conduced a deep analysis about the separation of ownership and control for
real sector listed companies that were security issuers and therefore listed corporations during
the 1996-2002 period in Colombia. The study provides for first time evidence for this economy
of direct measures of voting rights at the ultimate shareholder level following the modern
approach of recent studies of corporate ownership and control done for East Asia, and Euro-
pean countries. It also constitute the first comprehensive case study for a Latin American coun-
try where measures of voting rights are restricted to few cases with limited property layers with
out covering the entire business group structures.
Our findings suggest that direct ownership and direct voting blocks of the largest shareholder
has on average 35% of a company’s equity. This number is 20% below the average in continental
Europe. The stake of the top-four largest shareholders is about 65% matching the power level of
largest blocks observed in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Spain according to the
numbers reported in Becht’s study of control in Corporate Europe. We also found that ownership
concentration has risen about 5% from 1996 to 2002 but none single voting block has the 51%
absolute direct control under one share-one-vote regime. In particular, the top four shareholders
increased their direct control form 60% to 65% from 1996 to 2002 and the fraction of firms
increased from 20% to 30% where the top-four voting blocks have between 90% to 100% a
company’s stake. Equity concentration of the largest block is larger within non-affiliated firms
than the ones affiliated to business groups. In this case the largest stake is around 45% of company’s
total equity. Here it seems that stock holders prefer to have direct and absolute control.
Voting leverage is implemented within affiliated firms to business groups. The separation
ratio of cash flow to voting rights is on average 0.94, similar to the levels observed in emerging
markets with high equity concentration such as Thailand. The separation increases if one re-
stricts such measurement to affiliated firms, the top-four share holders or at controlling share-
holders within business groups. In particular, we found that the separation ratio for the top-four
block holders was around 0.77 for the 1996-1999 period, and it diminished to 0.74 for the
2000-2002 period, and the controlling owners of Sindicato Antioqueño is on average 0.87, which
is the largest business group in the country and a cross share holding. Thus, strategic sharehold-
ers increase their voting power through the cross shares and pyramids.
The analysis of controlling shareholders shows that around three-fourths of the firms
have ultimate controllers. Families are the most important source of equity power. We de-
composed ultimate owners in ten types of legal societies. We found that investment firms,
fiduciary fund contracts, and unlisted firms such as limited liability or non-traded corpora-
tions, families are behind those property layers and in fact they are the ultimate owners.
Equity control by financial institutions is less common and this finding is consistent with
what has been found in other developed and emerging capital markets. On the other hand,
corporate control is privately biased in contrast the strong and independent management bias
typically found within American corporations. Here, owners set firm control and policies.38 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN COLOMBIAN CORPORATIONS
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Concentration of cash flow rights and voting leverage constitute a natural barrier for deepen
corporate structures, develop capital markets, incentive firms to adopt codes of best prac-
tices and the further develop of institutional channels for good corporate governance ruling.
A positive finding on that regard is that firm listing increased during the period and the de-
listing pattern decreased at the same time.
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APPENDIX 1
The solution for y2 (Integrated ownership) of
y2 = A + y2A – D(y2)A (9)
Stars by matrix factorization:
y2 - y2 A = A - D(y2)A
y2 (I A)= (I - D(y2))A
(I -D(y2))-1 y2 = A(I - A)-1 (10)
Now we need an expression for D (y2), which can be obtained by matrix factorization of (10)
() ()
( ) ( ) () ()
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